In this paper, I clarify and defend the distinction between “anchoring” and “grounding.” In addition to the widely discussed grounding relation, anchoring is a different kind of metaphysical determination, and both need to be a part of full explanations of how facts are metaphysically determined....
This entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy presents an overview of the field of social ontology. The entry discusses approaches to the building blocks of the social world, social construction, and applications such as social groups, group minds, institutions, race, gender, the law, and...
Social groups are a central topic in social ontology. This paper presents a systematic approach for analyzing and explaining their nature. I argue against prominent views that attempt to unify all social groups or to divide them into simple typologies. Instead I argue that social...
The article summarizes The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. The book develops a new model for social ontology, applies it to groups and collective intentionality, and criticizes various forms of individualism....
In this chapter, I argue against the idea that there is a single generic method or set of requirements for generating social kinds. Instead, there is a variety of what I call “anchoring schemas.” Not only are social kinds a diverse lot, but the metaphysical...
In these replies to Katherine Hawley, Mari Mikkola, and Frank Hindriks, I address the role of grounding in social metaphysics, the distinction between anchoring and grounding, and the actions and intentions of social groups....
This article replies to comments by Francesco Guala and Mattia Gallotti on The Ant Trap. In the replies, I address the relation of new advances in cognitive science to the study of collective attitudes, clarify distinct questions we might ask about grounding and about anchoring...
The Ant Trap presents a new model of the social world and the foundations of the social sciences. It shows that the actions and intentions of social groups often depend on more than their members. (Oxford University Press, 2015)...
This paper sets out an organizing framework for the field of social ontology—the study of the nature of the social world. I define and explain two different inquiries: the study of the grounding of social facts, and the study of how social categories are “anchored”...
Individualists about social ontology hold that social facts are “built out of” facts about individuals. In this paper, I argue that there are two distinct kinds of individualism about social ontology, two different ways individual people might be the metaphysical “builders” of the social world....
