Generated by All in One SEO v5.0.0.1, this is an llms.txt file, used by LLMs to index the site. # Brian Epstein Professor of Philosophy, Tufts University ## Sitemaps - [XML Sitemap](https://epstein.org/sitemap.xml): Contains all public & indexable URLs for this website. ## Posts - [News](https://epstein.org/news/) - [The Ant Trap - under contract at Oxford](https://epstein.org/2013/11/ant-trap-contract-oxford/) - The signed contract for my new book just arrived in the mail! Here is a draft of the introduction. Comments welcome! The Ant Trap - Intro draft Nov 2013 - [Draft of a new paper clarifying two kinds of individualism about social ontology](https://epstein.org/2012/08/anchoring-vs-grounding/) - Many people believe that the social world is “made by” individual people. But there are two entirely different ways philosophers have thought about the relation between individuals and the social world, without really keeping the two separate. Here is a draft of a paper, in which I try to clarify two different kind of individualism - [New article on my work in Tufts Now](https://epstein.org/2015/09/new-article-on-my-work-in-tufts-now/) - Here is Taylor McNeil's article on my work in Tufts Now magazine. Rethinking the Social Sciences In a new book, philosopher Brian Epstein challenges the field’s basic assumptions - [TEDx Stanford Talk](https://epstein.org/2015/07/tedx-stanford-talk/) - http://youtu.be/FLbEKpL-5Z0 Read more at the TEDx Stanford site - [What Alabama’s Roy Moore Got Right](https://epstein.org/2015/02/what-alabamas-roy-moore-got-right/) - As promised, here's the piece for The Stone column in The New York Times! Click here to read it. - [The Ant Trap on Amazon and B&N](https://epstein.org/2015/02/ant-trap-amazon-bn/) - The Ant Trap is already available in electronic versions (Kindle and Nook)! Here are the links. Amazon Kindle B&N nook It will be coming out in hardcover in April. Looks as though they're pricing it around $35. Preorder Amazon hardcover - [New York Times - The Stone](https://epstein.org/2015/02/new-york-times-stone/) - Some exciting news! I have a piece coming out tomorrow morning (if no breaking news gets in the way) in the New York Times, in the Stone column. The Times is putting a VERY provocative headline on it -- but keep reading!! It's on the institution of marriage and the latest machinations in Alabama. I'll - [The proofs are ready!](https://epstein.org/2014/12/proofs-ready/) - Here is the typeset version of the intro and table of contents: Epstein - The Ant Trap - Intro and TOC proofs - [Summer 2013](https://epstein.org/2013/08/summer-2013/) - Upcom­ing classes for Fall 2013 are: Phi­los­o­phy of Social Sci­ence, which is an under­grad and grad­u­ate class. Using a cou­ple of new texts this term — the new anthol­ogy edited by Daniel Steel and Francesco Guala, and the new edi­tion of Alex Rosenberg’s introduction. And the grad­u­ate writ­ing sem­i­nar, which is a class for stu­dents in - [Fall classes](https://epstein.org/2012/08/fall-classes/) - Two new classes for the fall: Phil 103, Logic: This is an undergrad/grad-level class on propositional and predicate logic, translation, and so on. Phil 134, Philosophy of Social Science: This term the class will focus on social ontology, i.e., the nature of the social world. There will be some historical material, but most of it is recent - [New Analysis paper on how to understand "sortals"](https://epstein.org/2012/08/new-paper-on-sortals/) - Recently Harold Noonan published a very interesting paper about criteria of identity. There is a traditional distinction, going back to Frege, between the application conditions of a sortal term like ‘tiger’ and its criterion of identity. Noonan argues that this long tradition has made a logical error: at least on the standard interpretation, a criterion - [Paper with Patrick Forber on when it's ok to tweak simulations](https://epstein.org/2012/08/tweaking-simulations/) - Anyone who has written a simulation (or any kind of model) knows that the first attempt never works. Models are built iteratively — you build the model, run it, see what happens, then tweak the model, run it, tweak the model, run it, etc. Is this kosher? My colleague Patrick Forber and I argue that - [Review of an interesting collection on artifacts](https://epstein.org/2012/08/artifacts/) - This is a review of a collection of papers on artifacts, edited by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence. Although I’ve thought a lot about artifacts — objects like screwdrivers, chairs, and dollar bills — I haven’t written much about them directly. This review was a chance to talk about some interesting new papers, and suggest ## Pages - [Home](https://epstein.org/) - Discover the philosophical works, publications, and courses of Brian Epstein, a distinguished professor at Tufts University. Explore insightful content and engage with thought-provoking ideas. - [About](https://epstein.org/about/) - Brian Epstein is Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. His research interests include philosophy of social science, metaphysics, and philosophy of language, with a particular focus on social ontology and the nature of social institutions. He is the author of The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences and Social Ontology. The Ant - [FAQ](https://epstein.org/faq/) - Interested in working on a social ontology, modeling, or simulation project The field of social ontology is new, and there are many exciting and unexplored opportunities. If you are currently working on a project, want to learn more, or are interested in potential areas to investigate, please contact me directly by email. Applying to the - [The Ant Trap](https://epstein.org/the-ant-trap/) - The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences Winner of the 2016 Lakatos Award “Brian Epstein’s book is rated as ‘an extremely serious and significant book, as good a treatment of the social world as there is, by some way.’ It provides ‘an outstandingly elegant illustration of why metaphysical foundations really matter to - [Social Ontology (Cambridge Element)](https://epstein.org/element/) - New Cambridge Element, Social Ontology Free Download – Gold Open Access from Cambridge University Press Download Free PDF The aim of this Element is to provide an overview of this burgeoning field, and also to map the questions that theories in social ontology address. When we encounter a theory of some social thing—groups, law, gender, - [Ambient Intelligence](https://epstein.org/ambient-intelligence/) - Ambient Intelligence Documents in which the term 'ambient intelligence' was first coined and defined: 24 June 1998 - Draft of digital living room presentation circulated within Philips: DLR Final Internal.ppt 24 June 1998 - Revised digital living room script: DLR Script Internal.doc 27 May 1998 - Early draft of first presentation introducing ambient intelligence: - [Contact](https://epstein.org/contact/) - Brian Epstein Philosophy Department, Tufts University Miner Hall, 14 Upper Campus Rd. Medford, MA 02155 Tel: (617) 627-4701 Fax: (617) 627-3899 Email: brian.epstein@tufts.edu Email is the best way to reach me. (One way to email me is just to fill out the form below.) If I don’t respond within a couple of days, please don’t - [Publications](https://epstein.org/publications/) - Brian Epstein philosophy publications. Research in social ontology, cultural theory, and the methods of social science. ## Portfolio - ["Social Ontology" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/social-ontology-in-stanford-encyclopedia-of-philosophy/) - This entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy presents an overview of the field of social ontology. The entry discusses approaches to the building blocks of the social world, social construction, and applications such as social groups, group minds, institutions, race, gender, the law, and more. Chapters: 1. History, 2. The problem of demarcating social ontology, 3. Constituents of the social world, 4. How social categories and kinds are set up, 5. Key domains addressed by social ontology. A major revision was published in March 2024; the current entry is available at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. - [The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/the-ant-trap-rebuilding-the-foundations-of-the-social-sciences/) - The Ant Trap presents a new model of the social world and the foundations of the social sciences. It shows that the actions and intentions of social groups often depend on more than their members. (Oxford University Press, 2015) - [Social Ontology - Cambridge Element](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/social-ontology-cambridge-element/) - Social ontology is the study of the nature of the social world. The aim of this Element is to provide an overview of this burgeoning field, and also to map the questions that theories in social ontology address. When we encounter a theory of some social thing—groups, law, gender, etc.—how are we to read it? - [Daniel Dennett: His philosophical work and legacy](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/daniel-dennett-his-philosophical-work-and-legacy/) - A short talk I gave on Dan Dennett and his work, for a Tufts symposium celebrating his life. In the talk I discuss his methodology, projects, and legacy. - [Anchoring versus Grounding - Reply to Schaffer](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/anchoring-versus-grounding-reply-to-schaffer/) - In this paper, I clarify and defend the distinction between “anchoring” and “grounding.” In addition to the widely discussed grounding relation, anchoring is a different kind of metaphysical determination, and both need to be a part of full explanations of how facts are metaphysically determined. I discuss and reply to Schaffer's two alternative challenges -- his definitions reply and his relations reply. - [Biko on non-white and black: Improving social reality](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/biko-on-non-white-and-black-improving-social-reality/) - This paper examines Steve Biko’s distinction between black and non-white as a project in the “amelioration” of social concepts and categories. I discuss Biko’s continuity with Frantz Fanon, but also attempt to show how Biko moves beyond Fanon in crucial ways, solving problems that Fanon confronted. I explore the ways Biko attempts to transform an existing set of oppressive social categories in the world into new social categories. - [A Framework for Social Ontology](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/a-framework-for-social-ontology/) - This paper sets out an organizing framework for the field of social ontology—the study of the nature of the social world. I define and explain two different inquiries: the study of the grounding of social facts, and the study of how social categories are “anchored” or set up. With this distinction, we can clarify prominent programs in social theory, particularly theories of practice and varieties of individualism. (Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2016) - [What are social groups? Their metaphysics and how to classify them](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/what-are-social-groups-their-metaphysics-and-how-to-classify-them/) - Social groups are a central topic in social ontology. This paper presents a systematic approach for analyzing and explaining their nature. I argue against prominent views that attempt to unify all social groups or to divide them into simple typologies. Instead I argue that social groups are enormously diverse, but show how we can investigate their natures nonetheless. - [Replies to Hawley, Mikkola, and Hindriks](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/replies-to-hawley-mikkola-and-hindriks/) - In these replies to Katherine Hawley, Mari Mikkola, and Frank Hindriks, I address the role of grounding in social metaphysics, the distinction between anchoring and grounding, and the actions and intentions of social groups. - [Replies to Guala and Gallotti](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/replies-to-guala-and-gallotti/) - This article replies to comments by Francesco Guala and Mattia Gallotti on The Ant Trap. In the replies, I address the relation of new advances in cognitive science to the study of collective attitudes, clarify distinct questions we might ask about grounding and about anchoring in social ontology, defend various forms of pluralism about grounds and about anchors, and discuss the type-token distinction as it applies to social entities. - [Précis of The Ant Trap](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/precis-of-the-ant-trap/) - The article summarizes The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. The book develops a new model for social ontology, applies it to groups and collective intentionality, and criticizes various forms of individualism. - [New York Times piece: What Alabama's Roy Moore Got Right](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/new-york-times-piece-what-alabamas-roy-moore-got-right/) - This piece for The Stone argues that we as a society are already well underway in redefining marriage. Conservatives often use the terminology "redefining marriage" as political code. The piece argues for a sociological view of the institution of marriage. The courts do not have the power to define institutions, since they are only partly affected by legal doctrines. More important are the social practices that create the institution. Fortunately, we already have changed many of our social practices regarding same-sex marriage. We as a society have already redefined marriage, for the better. (New York Times, Feb. 16, 2015) - [Review of Language: A Biological Model by Ruth Millikan](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/review-of-language-a-biological-model-by-ruth-millikan/) - Ruth Millikan is one of the most interesting and influential philosophers alive. Her work is also hard to penetrate. In this review, I try to present and assess her work on the nature of language, which is collected in this anthology. I also criticize her analysis of “natural convention” as well as her discussion of illocutionary acts. (NDPR, 2006) - [Review of Creations of the Mind, edited by Margolis and Laurence](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/review-of-creations-of-the-mind-edited-by-margolis-and-laurence/) - This is a review of a collection of papers on artifacts, edited by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence. Although I’ve thought a lot about artifacts — objects like screwdrivers, chairs, and dollar bills — I haven’t written much about them directly. This review was a chance to talk about some interesting new papers, and suggest where some current thinking falls short. (Mind, 2012) - [Review of The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences, ed. by Jarvie and Zamorra-Bonilla](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/review-of-the-sage-handbook-of-the-philosophy-of-social-sciences-ed-by-jarvie-and-zamorra-bonilla/) - This interesting (and massive!) handbook is edited by Ian Jarvie, who also serves as editor of the journal Philosophy of the Social Sciences, and Jesús Zamora-​​Bonilla, philosopher of science at the National Open University of Spain. It has papers on the history of the philosophy of social sciences, social ontology, paradigms in the philosophy of social science, and methodologies. (Economics and Philosophy, 2012) - [The Internal and the External in Linguistic Explanation](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/the-internal-and-the-external-in-linguistic-explanation/) - I develop a functional theory of linguistic entities. Chomsky and others have denied the relevance of external linguistic entities, such as E-languages, to linguistic explanation, and have questioned their coherence altogether. I discuss a new approach to understanding the nature of linguistic entities, focusing in particular on making sense of the varieties of kinds of “words” that are employed in linguistic theorizing. This treatment of linguistic entities in general is applied to constructing an understanding of external linguistic entities. (CJP, 2008) - [When Local Models Fail](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/when-local-models-fail/) - A paper on some implications of new work on the nature of groups, for modeling in the social sciences. Here I focus on economic models of corruption. (Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2008) - [Grounds, Convention, and the Metaphysics of Linguistic Tokens](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/grounds-convention-and-the-metaphysics-of-linguistic-tokens/) - My aim in this paper is to discuss a metaphysical framework within which to understand “standard linguistic entities” (SLEs), such as words, sentences, phonemes, and other entities routinely employed in linguistic theory. In doing so, I aim to defuse certain kinds of skepticism, challenge convention-based accounts of SLEs, and present a series of distinctions for better understanding what the various accounts of SLEs do and do not accomplish. (CJP, 2009) - [Ontological Individualism Reconsidered](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/ontological-individualism-reconsidered/) - Ontological individualism is the thesis that facts about individuals exhaustively determine social facts. Ontological individualism has more recently been understood as a global supervenience claim, and is almost universally accepted. In this paper I argue that ontological individualism is false. I explore why it is that people have taken ontological individualism to be true. (Synthese, 2009) - [The Diviner and the Scientist: Revisiting the Question of Alternative Standards of Rationality](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/the-diviner-and-the-scientist-revisiting-the-question-of-alternative-standards-of-rationality/) - Do people in other cultures have different “standards of rationality”? Are the standards of reasoning and rationality in divination, religious practice, and textual exegesis different from those in the sciences? I discuss recent developments in philosophy that approach the issue from a number of new directions, changing our understanding of reasoning and rationality. I argue that a careful treatment of rationality points the way forward to investigating modest but interesting ways for there to be alternative standards of rationality. (Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 2010) - [Agent-Based Models and the Fallacies of Individualism](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/agent-based-models-and-the-fallacies-of-individualism/) - A critical look at agent-​​based modeling in the social sciences. Two misconceptions about the relation between social macroproperties and microproperties afflict agent-based models. These lead current models to systematically ignore factors relevant to the properties they intend to model, and to overlook a wide range of model designs. Correcting for these brings painful trade-​​offs, but has the potential to transform the utility of such models. (in Models, Simulations, and Representations, 2011) - [The Perils of Tweaking: How to Use Macrodata to Set Parameters in Complex Simulation Models](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/the-perils-of-tweaking-how-to-use-macrodata-to-set-parameters-in-complex-simulation-models/) - When can modelers tune their models, after the fact? We argue that "tweaking" a simulation can be effective but that there are two central risks. First, it risks overfitting the simulation to the data and thus compromising predictive accuracy; and second, it risks compromising the microfoundationality of the simulation. We evaluate standard responses to tweaking and propose strategies to guard against these risks. (Synthese, 2012) - [Sortals and Criteria of Identity](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/sortals-and-criteria-of-identity/) - In a recent article, Harold Noonan argues that application conditions and criteria of identity are not distinct from one another. This seems to threaten the standard approach to distinguishing sortals from adjectival terms. I propose that his observation, while correct, does not have this consequence. I present a simple scheme for distinguishing sortals from adjectival terms. I also propose an amended version of the standard canonical form of criteria of identity. (Analysis, 2012) - [Social Objects without Intentions](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/social-objects-without-intentions/) - Argues against a "mentalistic" picture of the social world. It is often seen as a truism that social objects and facts are the product of human intentions. I argue that the role of intentions in social ontology is commonly overestimated. I propose a more worldly – and less intellectualist – approach to social ontology. (in Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents, 2013) - [What is Individualism in Social Ontology? Ontological Individualism vs. Anchor Individualism](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/what-is-individualism-in-social-ontology-ontological-individualism-vs-anchor-individualism/) - Individualists about social ontology hold that social facts are “built out of” facts about individuals. In this paper, I argue that there are two distinct kinds of individualism about social ontology, two different ways individual people might be the metaphysical “builders” of the social world. Anchor individualism is often conflated with ontological individualism. But in fact, the two theses are in tension with one another: if one of these kinds of individualism is true, then the other is very unlikely to be. My aim in this paper is to clarify both, and argue that they should be sharply distinguished from one another. (in Rethinking the Individualism/Holism Debate, 2014) - [How Many Kinds of Glue Hold the Social World Together?](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/how-many-kinds-of-glue-hold-the-social-world-together/) - In this chapter, I argue against the idea that there is a single generic method or set of requirements for generating social kinds. Instead, there is a variety of what I call “anchoring schemas.” Not only are social kinds a diverse lot, but the metaphysical explanation for their being the kinds they are is diverse as well. I explain the idea of anchoring and present examples of social kinds that are similar to one another but that are anchored in different ways. (in Social Ontology and Social Cognition, 2015) - [Why Macroeconomics does not Supervene on Microeconomics](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/why-macroeconomics-does-not-supervene-on-microeconomics/) - Reductionists and anti-reductionists alike have taken it to be trivial that the macroeconomic facts are exhaustively determined by microeconomic ones. In this paper, I challenge this supposed triviality. I argue that macroeconomic properties do not even globally supervene on microeconomic ones. This means that microeconomics-based foundations for macroeconomics are inadequate in principle. (Journal of Economic Methodology, 2014) - [The Realpolitik of Reference](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/the-realpolitik-of-reference/) - How do we fix the reference of a proper name? More importantly, why is that the way we fix reference? I sketch a new pragmatic approach to the justification of reference-fixing procedures. Comparing reference to other relations whose instances are introduced through "initiation" procedures, I outline a picture in which the procedures that are successful for fixing the reference of proper names depend in part on regularities in the actual environment. (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2008) - [History and the Critique of Social Concepts](https://epstein.org/portfolio_page/history-and-the-critique-of-social-concepts/) - Many theorists, including Nietzsche, Adorno, and Foucault, have regarded genealogy as an important technique for social criticism. But it has been unclear how genealogy can go beyond the accomplishments of other, more mundane, critical methods. I propose a new approach to understanding the critical potential of history. (Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2010) ## Categories - [Uncategorized](https://epstein.org/category/uncategorized/) - [General](https://epstein.org/category/general/) ## Portfolio Categories - [Social Ontology](https://epstein.org/portfolio-category/social-world/) - [Language & Metaphysics](https://epstein.org/portfolio-category/language/) - [Methods of Social Science](https://epstein.org/portfolio-category/method/) - [Cultural Theory](https://epstein.org/portfolio-category/cultural-theory/) ## Testimonials Categories - [Ant Trap](https://epstein.org/testimonials-category/ant-trap/) ## Sliders - [Homepage](https://epstein.org/slides-category/homepage/)